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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the notion that the 
creative class may or may not play as a causal mechanism of 
urban regeneration. The paper begins with a review of Florida’s 
argument focusing on the conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings. The second section develops a critique of the 
relationship  between  the  creative  class  and  growth.  This  is 
followed by an attempt to clarify the relationship between the 
concepts of creativity, culture and the creative industries. Finally, 
the paper suggests that policy makers may achieve more 
successful regeneration outcomes if they attend to the cultural 
industries as an object that links production and consumption, 
manufacturing and service. Such a notion is more useful in 
interpreting and understanding the significant role of cultural 
production in contemporary cities, and what relation it has to 
growth. 
3  
Creative cities: the cultural industries and the creative class 
 
 
 
0. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the role that the notion 
of the creative class plays, as a causal mechanism, in urban 
regeneration. Specifically, I want to offer a response to Florida’s 
(2002; 2004; 2005) thesis which posits the creative class as the 
motor of urban regeneration. My specific concern is to examine 
critically the mechanism presumed for regeneration, and, to judge 
precisely what potential is claimed to be inherent in the ‘creative 
class’. I will argue that the idea of the creative class is far from 
new; in fact it is a revival of the hi-tech ‘boosterism’ and place 
marketing. It is in this latter sense that I accept, for the most part, 
the tenor of Peck’s (2005) trenchant criticism of Florida focused on 
place competition and consumption. However, I want to open up a 
further line of critique that addresses what I regard as a weakness 
in both Peck’s argument, as well as much work in economic 
geography, that ignores the productive dimensions of the cultural 
industries. The topic of the creative class is commonly elided with 
the notion of  ‘creative cities’. It is not my intention here to discuss, 
nor  should  this  elision  be  confused  with  the  concept  of,  the 
creative city (Landry 2000) which has another intellectual 
justification and trajectory. Nevertheless, we have to accept that 
lay usage of Florida’s work is commonly deployed as the means by 
which cities may be made ‘creative’. Moreover, the ideas of the 
creative class and the creative city should not be confused with the 
‘city of culture’ (a policy pursued by the European Commission) 
(Paddison 1993). Despite the important differences which are 
discussed in this paper these concepts do have one commonality: 
they  are  instrumental  policies  which  seek  to  use  ‘culture’  or 
‘creativity’  to  achieve  specific  ‘non-cultural’  ends.  This  paper 
argues for the need to develop non-instrumental policies that 
specifically seek to develop the cultural industries. The cultural 
industries, are, it is argued one of the potential motors of urban 
growth and regeneration in their own right. 
 
 
In the paper I suggest how both Florida’s line of argument, as well 
as Peck’s critique, has sidetracked other important arguments 
concerning the role and potential of culture in cities. At first sight 
such a claim seems strange and contemporary debates about 
urban policy are littered with ‘culture’ and ‘creativity’. In particular, 
the trajectory I want to stress is the focus on cultural production 
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rather than on ‘culture policy’ that focuses on consumption (cultural 
and otherwise). It is not that I have any ideological or economic 
problems with consumption per se (this is, in part, what I believe 
drives Peck’s argument); in fact, I see production and consumption 
as a false dualism, in practice we need to reintegrate analyses of 
production and consumption (Pratt 2004a). This is why the cultural 
industries are such an emblematic site of debate and practice; they 
are a practical example of the hybrid and complex relationships 
between production and consumption, the symbolic and material. 
Moreover, reacting to the ‘placelessness’ of much debate about 
place marketing, I want to stress that culture is produced in 
particular places and times: and, that context is important in, or 
perhaps more accurately constitutive of, social, cultural and 
economic fields. 
 
 
I will consider how this debate has sidetracked other important 
arguments concerning the role and potential of culture in cities. 
The paper has two lines of critique. First, the mis-identification of 
causality  (the  creative  class  and  urban  change);  second,  the 
issues of operationalising the measure of the creative class; and 
finally, the focus on consumption at the expense of production 
(that is, presenting it as a dualism rather than as a notion that 
includes the whole cycle for production through to consumption). 
 
 
This paper argues that the existing line of thought has prioritised 
consumption or/and idealised culture; it has also preserved the 
dualism of manufacturing and services, as well as that of 
production and consumption. In so doing researchers and policy 
makers have overlooked, and discounted, the significance of the 
growth in importance to economies, and society more generally, of 
cultural production. In particular the trajectory I stress is the 
potential for an alternative focus on cultural production rather than 
cultural or creative policy that focuses on consumption (cultural 
and otherwise).  In its conclusion this paper seeks to turn attention 
to   the   issue   of   cultural   production  and   its   role   in   urban 
regeneration. 
 
 
The paper begins with a review of Florida’s argument focusing on 
the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings. The second section 
develops a critique of the relationship between the creative class 
and growth. This is followed by a disentanglement and clarification 
of the relationship between the concepts of creativity, culture and 
the creative industries. Finally, the paper proposes a need to focus 
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on the cultural industries as a process that links production and 
consumption, manufacturing and service. Such a concept is more 
useful in interpreting and understanding the significant role of 
cultural production in contemporary cities, and what relation it has 
to growth. 
 
 
 
1. The Rise of the Creative Class revisited 
 
 
Richard Florida’s work on the creative class has focused on a 
means of measuring, and hence ranking, what he argues are the 
most significant characteristics that make cities ‘creative’. Actually, 
the variables used are those that Florida argues will endear an 
area to the creative class: Technology, Talent, and Tolerance. The 
‘3 T’s’ do not make creativity, creative cities or workers, they are 
simply posited as factors of attraction (or proxies of them). The 
creative class is defined as those whose occupations range from 
artists and software designers (the ‘super-creative core’) to 
management and legal experts (the ‘creative professionals’). 
Florida argues that these occupations are the ‘magnets’ to which 
mobile, high tech and high growth firms are drawn. In turn, it is 
argued that what draws the people who populate these critical 
occupations is tolerant, or liberal communities, and work 
environments plus a bohemian consumption space. 
 
 
So, to be clear, Florida is making an argument for attracting 
particular labour, or occupations, to a place; which in turn, it is 
claimed, if they are in short supply will - in turn - cause hi-tech 
industries to move to that location to be close to such a labour 
pool. Logically, what is not being argued here is that there is an 
intrinsic value in ‘culture’ that attracts the ‘creatives’. Nor, it may be 
argued, that there is intrinsic value in the cultural practices that 
they (the creative class) are either engaged in, or attracted to. In 
fact, culture and the creative industries, are in this formulation an 
instrumental sideshow that in turn attracts the workers, which 
attracts the hi-tech investors. In this sense, the argument has little 
to differentiate it in principle from traditional behavioural and 
environmental determinist arguments, or from property-led 
strategies. 
 
 
In short, it is an exercise in place marketing, except that now a 
‘boho down town’ is the magnet whose primary objective is to 
attract a labour pool, which will in turn attract hi-tech industries, 
6  
and lead to growth. This new version is not primarily about 
stimulating consumption multipliers as an employment knock-on 
effect. In its own terms the hypothesis begs the question of the 
relationship between a defined ‘boho-ness’ and between the 
presence of the creative class and economic growth. In broad 
terms this is what Florida seeks to achieve in his analysis using a 
range of proxies; however, whilst the numbers look convincing the 
underlying concepts are woolly. It depends on how one defines the 
‘3 Ts’ and which variables you use, and what relationship they 
have to target variables: this is not something that Florida 
examines, nor discusses, critically. Moreover, much rests on the 
definition of the creative class itself; again, this is not opened up to 
debate. These are important empirical issues, but they are not the 
main burden of my critique, the conceptualisation of process is. 
 
 
Creative boosters 
 
 
Florida taps into a rich seam of envy and aspiration for ‘city 
boosters’ by constructing an index of these qualities that simply 
ranks one city against another, and points to simple policy ‘fixes’ to 
help a city better itself1. Florida’s initial ranking was confined to the 
USA,  however  it  has  been  fabricated  for  Europe  as  a  whole 
(Florida and Tinagali 2004); many nations have also sought to 
deploy the methodology for their own territories (Andersen and 
Lorenzen 2005). The reasons for the popularity of Florida’s 
methodology for ranking cities in terms of ‘creativity’ is clear. Who 
would not want their city to be scientifically ranked as the ‘coolest’ 
on earth: the most creative city? It makes the residents feel good, 
politicians feel even better, and makes outsiders envious: so much 
so that they might even visit. Such desires are the stock in trade of 
the snake oil salesperson. Those peddling culture or creativity 
follow a long line of previous potions: environment, safety, 
liveability, hi-tech, bio-, or nano- industry. To be clear, it is not the 
moniker that matters for the exercise but what it is suggestive of: 
growth. 
 
 
Why has growth (and competition) become the watchword of the 
late C20th urban manager? The answer lies in the fact that 
traditional manufacturing activities have declined in the developed 
world. To be correct these industries did not decline, they are 
growing faster than ever, what they did is moved away to cheaper 
(and more suitable) properties, and to cheaper labour sources. 
The former industrial cities became ‘hollowed out’; a vacuum that 
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has been filled by financial services activities and stimulated new 
building. Shortly after, offices relocated ‘back offices’ and cities 
have once again begun to struggle; likewise, retail has moved out 
of town. The problem was that many of the manufacturing workers 
remained, unemployed. Others, previously out of the labour market 
were  drawn  into  clearing,  security  and  retailing  (Logan  and 
Molotch 1987; Castells 1989; Harvey 1989b;a; Sassen 2001). An 
influential   line   of   argument   suggests   that   the   competitive 
advantage of cities is their ‘experience’; hence the discussion of 
promoting creativity and the consumption experience, the 
commercial version of which is represented in Pine and Gilmore’s 
book (1999). It is precisely this strategy that Peck, after Harvey 
(1989b), so despairs of. 
 
 
Returning to the point about new economies we might ask where 
the money stops; or, who eventually enjoys the benefits of the 
investment?  Attracting mobile companies can result in little local 
investment and little security that the company will not move as 
soon as it can find somewhere cheaper. In this discourse neither 
the creative city, nor the creative class, is concerned with the 
creative economy. The creative city is presented as a city that is 
attractive to, and populated by, a creative class who works in the 
new economy, or more likely in high-tech and bio-tech. The 
Bourgeois Bohemian (BoHo) city is the magnet for migrant 
educated labour that works in the hi-tech industries. The creative 
city is an in-town speciality shopping centre. Of course, it is simply 
a re-visioning of the liveable cities (via Quality of Life (QoL) 
indicators) that have been promoted for so long (to attract middle 
and higher management of TNCs who have to relocate staff). The 
notion of QoL comes from rational choice economics which 
suggests that ‘consumers’ of local state services vote with their 
feet   (Tiebout  1956).  This   notion  has   been  developed  into 
numerous indicators that urban authorities can compare 
themselves with one another (Myers 1988; Luger 1996). 
 
 
The creative economy? 
 
 
Thus we can see that, along with the international mode of 
economic production notably mobilised via outsourcing or remote 
manufacturing, cities lose their own manufacturing jobs and 
potentially seek to compete to attract new ones. Culture can be 
viewed as the latest bauble that is offered to attract CEO’s. 
Specifically, it is cultural consumption that is prized. Inter alia this 
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has resulted in investment in cultural facilities; usually large scale 
(hence visible) infrastructure that are targeted at elite consumers. 
Such a strategy brings with it inherent contradictions of capital 
versus revenue funding (where buildings are paid for, but not the 
activities to populate them), prestige versus ‘ordinary’ culture, 
infrastructure versus networks and training, and one off versus 
strategic development. 
 
Somewhere along the line many cities2  stopped processing raw 
materials and became ‘ideas re-processors’. The problem is that 
ideas can be re-located more easily than heavy plant, especially if 
those  ideas  are  traded  on-line.  Some  of  these  ideas  and 
knowledge activities are significantly embedded in local cultures of 
production; others less so. Thus, these activities are commonly 
viewed as the mobile ‘fairy dust’ of the modern city: if only the dust 
sprinkles on them they will be happy and grow. This is not to 
suggest that mobility is all – but where it is cities that compete with 
one another for investment as in one gross beauty pageant. It is as 
if cities and regions lost the faith in generating their own wealth 
and began to believe that wealth could only come from elsewhere. 
This line of thought suits those of a neo-liberal persuasion who 
view cities and regions as players in a global market: competition 
is all. Remarkably, such experts on competition seem to over look 
the costs   of   competition  (Porter   1995),   and   the   fact   that 
competitions only have one winner and many losers (again, not a 
sensible resource allocation model as cities can’t be permitted to 
simply slide into liquidation). 
 
 
The neo-liberal line on manufacturing re-location is simple, move 
into knowledge business; it’s the next big thing. Of course, with the 
legacy of past investment in education, developed countries are 
likely to do well. Hence, the push for a stake in the new economy, 
knowledge economy, the competitive economy, or the creative 
economy (Garnham 2005a). There is nothing wrong per se with 
the  knowledge  economy  as  better  or  worse  than  any  other 
concept. The problem is  with in the teleological argument that 
simply presents the ‘creative economy’ as a higher (and critically, 
the next) form of development. As I will point out below, this is a 
fundamental conceptual confusion common in the analysis of the 
service sector generally that fails to see the manufacturing 
component of services. We might see the cultural industries as 
part of the service sector, however, my point is that the service 
industries and manufacturing are integrated, one and the same. I, 
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along with others (Walker 1985), would oppose the claim that 
services (or, in extremis, the cultural industries) are simply the 
‘icing on the cake’ of the ‘real economy’. 
 
2. Daniel Bell, class and values 
 
 
The fact that a North American academic has a best selling book 
extolling the positive impact of a particular class may seem 
surprising. Clearly, Florida is not using a Marxian mode of class 
analysis here; there is no sensible way that the ‘creative class’ 
occupies a unique and common position in relation to the means of 
production, or that is in any way conscious of itself. Nor, is Florida 
seeking to suggest that the ‘creative class’ is a new class fraction 
such as that discussed under the rubric of the service class (a 
fragment of the bourgeoisie) (Goldthorpe 1982). 
 
 
In fact in Florida’s work, class is reduced to taxonomy, moreover, 
one whose boundaries are not clearly defined (as in the use of 
‘middle class’ in the US that includes almost everyone). Florida’s 
occupational list is eclectic to say the least; this is further betrayed 
by the insertion of a ‘super-creative class’ within the category. To 
deploy an income and occupation classification and to read off 
causality is deterministic. In an attempt to challenge the 
deterministic interpretation of class and its consumption 
preferences writers such as Bourdieu (1979; 1993) have been at 
pains to separate out ‘cultural capital’ (gained through education 
and social conditioning) and money capital. (See also the debates 
about gentrification and culture (O'connor and Wynne 1998; Lees 
2000;2003). 
 
 
Florida’s term of reference is, like Manuel Castells’  (1989; 1996) 
later work, that of the American futurologist Daniel Bell (1973), 
writer of The coming post-industrial society. Bell’s thesis remains 
attractive to those who accept the notion of economic 
modernisation. Bell points to the emergence of a cadre of 
scientists, or knowledge workers3, who will be required to service 
and create the scientific and technological means of a post- 
industrial society4. He further argues that the state and market will 
have to orientate itself to this new group. In effect this group will 
become both the prime consumer and politically axial group. Thus, 
far from Marxian class consciousness and collective action through 
which they may make their presence felt, rather it is through their 
spending  power  and  preferences;  or,  as  Florida  has  it,  their 
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‘values’ through which they make their social and economic impact 
felt. What are these values, and where do they come from? Here 
we have a rather empty silence in Florida’s work. It is strange, 
given its importance as an explanatory factor, that the creative 
class’s ‘values’ are not interrogated. It seems as if they are read 
back from the assumed values of their consumption practices5. In 
Florida’s work we simply jump to the fact that these creative class 
like ‘boho-culture’6 to the possession of unitary core values of 
diversity, tolerance. 
 
 
Perhaps Florida should have read Bell’s work more closely; in the 
Cultural contradictions of capitalism Bell (1978) raises the 
conservative concern that such a group of educated persons may 
want more freedom and turn to radicalism in politics. Bell thus 
viewed them, or their values, as a threat to post-industrial society: 
hence, the cultural contradictions of capitalism. Frank’s (1997) 
insightful analysis of advertising and fashion industries in the US in 
the 1960-70s is a convincing account of how markets were opened 
up and expanded with new products and materials styled using the 
notion of rebellion: what Frank calls ‘the conquest of cool’. In an 
earlier manifestation of a similar argument Debord (1994) termed 
the ‘society of the spectacle’. It is important to note that the 
spectacle was more the ‘bread and circuses’ that Harvey refers to 
as characterising contemporary urban cultural consumption; 
Debord points to the fact that rebellion and critique are themselves 
incorporated (recuperated) in the ‘spectacle’. Set against such a 
sophisticated cultural and political analysis it is a little naive, to see 
as Florida does, an autonomous creative consumer as an agent of 
change. 
 
 
 
Education, mobility and gentrification 
 
 
Returning to the origins of the creative class argument we need to 
reprise to economy theory: human capital mobility theory to be 
precise. Glasser’s  (1998) work, on which Florida bases much of 
his causal process, hypothesises that there is a relationship 
between the level of education of labour and the degree of 
economic growth of cities. Florida develops a line of argument 
concerning how to attract educated labour and, thereby attracting 
high-tech industries, and to achieve growth. Florida argues that 
high-tech industries are increasingly pulled to labour resources (or 
where labour will go). Thus, cities attractive to labour (in these 
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industries) will reap the rewards of growth. Florida’s hypothesis is 
that this segment of labour that is in such demand constitutes ‘the 
creative class’ and is attracted to locations with particular 
consumption   patterns,   as   well   as   a   ‘tolerant’   governance 
framework (public and private). In Florida’s conception education 
produces culture, however, not in the nuanced manner examined 
by Bourdieu (1979). Setting on one side Florida’s assertion about 
education and its proxy occupation, we can also underline the fact 
that the creative class debate is not about the cultural industries or 
cultural production. 
 
 
It is worth noting that a pattern observed in cities for many years 
now, as pointed out in Zukin’s (1982) seminal work, is a particular 
form of ‘cultural gentrification’ of cities. Here artists colonise cheap 
and dilapidated property, in time those seeking a ‘bobo culture’ 
(Brooks 2001; Lloyd 2006) move in so as to be close to the artists. 
Of course, the key point for cultural entrepreneurs and artists is 
that as the art galleries and rich loft owners move in the artists are 
forced out due to rising prices (Shorthouse 2004). This provides us 
with a strong empirical message as to how consumption based re- 
generation is corrosive to production based versions. Some policy 
makers consider that it may be a price worth paying for growth; 
however, it is certainly not a good way to promote the cultural 
industries or the creativity so often valued in them. This paper will 
argue that the real challenge is to find an accommodation between 
production and consumption, rather than seeing them as opposites 
we should see that as part of the same process. Before this, it is 
necessary to explore the roots of the binary concepts of production 
and consumption, manufacturing and service and what relation the 
cultural industries have to them. 
 
 
 
From flexible production to flexible consumption 
 
 
More generally, the tenor of political economic argument of the last 
25 years has played down issues of consumption and identity, 
concentrating instead on production and organisation, pointing to 
the crisis of mass production and the resolution via post-fordism, 
or flexible production(Piore and Sabel 1984). Marxists such as 
Harvey (1989c) point to the falling rate of profit and under- 
consumption triggered by the oil crisis in 19737. There is a strong 
line of debate that seeks to rebuff the notion of a post-industrial or 
post-manufacturing economy arguing that ‘manufacturing matters’ 
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(Cohen and Zysman 1987). Most writers focus on the new 
production technologies either using Computer Numerical Control 
(CNC)  machinery  or  the  flexible  deployment  of  labour  and 
networks of small firms. Critically, in the sense that the debate has 
retained old ‘manufacturing’ taxonomies, such a position also 
echoes the prejudice of neoclassical economists that the cultural 
(or the whole service sector) is ‘non-basic’, and therefore finally 
dependent on manufacturing activity. It is this legacy that Peck and 
Harvey are rooted in. However, the step that writers from such a 
position   commonly   fail   to   take   is   to   re-conceptualise   the 
relationship between manufacturing and services, or production 
and consumption. It was a debate that was a conceptual interest of 
Marx, who viewed production as a necessary complement of 
consumption and visa versa: they are co-dependent. Many of the 
debates about the definition of the service sector raise precisely 
this issue (Walker 1985; Pratt 2004a). 
 
 
The shadow of these manufacturing-service, and production- 
consumption, dualisms also haunts debates about the cultural 
economy characterising it  as  either the  culturalisation of 
production, or the economisation of culture (Lash and Urry 1993; 
Scott 2000; Amin and Thrift 2004); these dualisms need to be 
transcended. We can see plenty of empirical examples of such 
hybridisation  in  the  cultural  economy:  multiple  versions  of  the 
same product, designer versions of a product, or a director’s cut, 
DJ mix, etc. seek to stimulate multiple purchase of essentially the 
same item. Along with multiple products comes the necessary 
development of retailing, distribution and advertising. To take one 
recent and iconic example, Jonathan Eve redesigned the Apple 
Mac, and the iPod, and this design mobilised new consumption 
and new production, not only in computers, but also across the 
brand into music. Thus, we should perhaps talk of the neo- 
industrial economy rather than a post-industrial one. 
 
 
 
Architecture and Technology 
 
 
Returning to Bell, and in particular to Castells’ (1989; 1996) 
development of Bell’s line of thought in both The Information 
Society and The Network Society, we can see a strong strand of 
technological determinism. That is, the assumption that certain 
technologies deliver particular modes of economic development. 
Without  doubt,  Castells  sees  a  massive  role  for  ICTs  and 
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envisages that it is these that transform our relationships, in 
particular  and  predictable  ways.  Regrettably,  it  is  this  line  of 
thought that has propelled many cities and regions to jump on the 
science band-wagon. With manufacturing gone, the knee-jerk 
reaction is to get in some science and high technology (the next 
big thing). Even better, such activities are believed to be biddable 
as they are footloose. Thus began the round of bidding and 
subsidies to attract plant relocation; research and development 
were considered little different aside from the fact that a higher 
labour market quality was sought. The second wave of marketing 
was thus aimed at creating science parks that would both incubate 
new ideas developed in universities (Massey. D, Quintas. P et al. 
1992), but critically serve as homes for the high-tech industries 
(the subject of Florida’s earlier work (Florida and Kennedy 1988)). 
Examine any city booster’s package and you will see high tech, 
bio-tech, nano-tech and (a few years ago) multi-media as 
investment targets. Capturing science parks seemed to be about 
creating the right ‘environment’. The ‘strategy’ seemed to be 
reduced to building a number of plate glass buildings in parkland 
with duck ponds: anywhere could be ‘silicon valley/alley/fen’. 
 
 
The problem of this sort of competition is that everyone can 
construct buildings, or, in the cultural vein, opera houses and 
galleries: but, what is it that attracts the staff? If consumption is 
encouraged then house location and leisure time begin to play a 
larger role in the mind of labour, especially in a tight labour market. 
As we have noted, a key weapon in the city booster’s armoury was 
that targeted at the chief executives and decision makers: the 
selling of ‘high culture’ facilities and a good ‘quality of life’. Reviews 
of the trends in urban advertising and promotion can be found 
elsewhere (Kearns and Philo 1993; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Short 
and Kim 1998). Suffice it to say that the latest wave of place 
promotion has used high culture facilities to differentiate one city 
from one another. The urban managers’ response has invariably 
been  to  build  a  cultural  facility,  especially  if  a  controversial 
architect could be involved as well (aesthetics aside, if it develops 
controversy and publicity it has achieved its aim). Thus, the 
duplication of modern art galleries, opera houses and the like. As 
advertisers have long known, successful campaigns build upon the 
identification of the Unique Selling Point (USP) of the product. 
Against this what could be more unique that an historical heritage? 
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So, cities have promoted what it is not possible to replicate: culture 
and / or heritage. Early efforts mimicked the tourist industry and 
turned to ‘cultural tourism’ and ‘heritage’ (Richards 1996); later that 
shifted  to  everyday  culture:  the  cultural  quarter.  The  cultural 
quarter has a diverse legacy based in neighbourhood re- 
generation (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993; Bianchini and 
Santacatterina 1997); but the concept has been used more 
commonly  as  a  site  for  (up  market)  consumption  (Mommaas 
2004): all the better if this attracts moneyed ‘cultural tourists’ as 
well as ‘the creative class’. 
 
 
As the critical literature notes, this trend to sell cities using public 
money is a socially regressive form of taxation; it is also politically 
divisive (Zukin 1995; Pratt 2000). If one accepts either a 
consumption driven version of class, or a more socially articulated 
one, promoting elite culture is going to alienate a large proportion 
of the electorate. The pay off, supporters would argue, is a trickle 
down effect of more jobs and economic growth. The evidence on 
this is rather thin as illustrated by the paradigmatic case: Bilbao 
(Plaza 2000). The following section turns to the consideration of 
‘creativity’ itself as a draw for investors. As I have already pointed 
out, creativity or the creative class (which is assumed ipso facto to 
be creative) has been identified as the magic ingredient that 
generates contemporary urban growth. Thus, closer examination 
of the potential causal powers of creativity is important. 
 
 
 
3. Creative industries and cultural industries 
 
 
Where does this leave the argument in relation to the creative 
class, or ‘creativity’ as a driver of regeneration? Much depends 
upon what we mean by creativity. Until the late 1990s nobody used 
the term creative industries; after the UK Creative Industries Task 
force produced its first mapping document, the creative industries 
became the flavour of the moment (Dcms 1998). Other countries 
fell into line with this preferred usage. Previously, the term cultural 
industries had been used to refer to a similar domain of policy and 
activity (O'connor 2004; Garnham 2005b; Pratt 2005). The term 
cultural industry was a rather amorphous one that sometimes was 
indicative of commercial activities, sometimes not. As is noted 
elsewhere, the shift of terminology was not mere semantics but 
highly political (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005). Output, export and 
employment measures gave what had been regarded as the ‘arts’ 
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some credibility in an era of downward pressure on policy funds 
and a ‘results driven’ mode of government in the UK. Politically, 
the creative industries could be distanced from the cultural 
industries: the former indicating New Labour, the latter Old Labour. 
However, the terminology ‘creative’ is politically agile. Creativity is 
universally seen as a positive characteristic: who wants to be un- 
creative? Moreover, creativity provides a positive ‘feel’ as against 
the ambivalence of ‘culture’ (which carries with it suspicions of high 
culture and exclusion, as well as antipathy to business). 
 
 
Moreover, the term cultural industry always existed in tension with 
the ‘arts’. One key element about the policy usage of the term 
creative industries is that is was underpinned by an operational 
definition. Inter alia this created the possibility of placing the 
creative industries along side other areas of government policy 
and providing output measures that were robust. Arguably, it was 
this step that was the most significant in putting the creative 
industries ‘on the map’ (Pratt 2001). For an essentially neo-liberal 
government such as the UK’s New Labour who sought to continue 
the policy of ‘competition’ as a watchword for economic strategy 
these new creative industries made a convenient bedfellow. They 
also ensured that the economic, commercial and individualist 
dimensions were emphasised. At the same time, politically, they 
drove a wedge between the publicly funded and non-commercial 
orientated arts sector; a tension that was exacerbated by reduced 
funding and the exhortation to be more like the creative industries. 
 
 
The term creativity had also, at that time, achieved common 
currency in the fields of business studies and management as the 
‘x-factor’ for corporate development (Jeffcutt and Pratt 2002). Both 
at the level of the individual, and as  a  mode of  management 
(Henry 1991; Lampel, Lant et al. 2000). The notion being that new 
markets, or even market share, could only be attained via ‘creative’ 
solutions. It was as if ‘traditional’ tools had reached their limits and 
creative ones would take businesses the ‘extra mile’. This line of 
argument linked very closely to the longer running obsession with 
‘entrepreneurship’ (Garnham 2005b). In this sense both to be 
enterprising and to be creative seem to overlap: both suggest risk 
taking, bold, and ‘out of the box’ thinking: doing things differently. 
Again, entrepreneurship could, it was argued, create new market 
share – to do more with the same. Interestingly, within these fields 
of expertise creativity and entrepreneurship were reductive 
definitions:  they  were  qualities  of  individuals  that  somehow 
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diffused organisations. Moreover, it followed for many that such 
notions should be inculcated young. Ken Robinson, and expert on 
creativity and education (Robinson 2001), and lead author of the 
report (1999) All our futures, strongly urged the government to 
make creativity the watchword of all education8. 
 
 
A long running critique of notions of enterprise and creativity, as 
well as associated terms like innovation, has been that they have 
been characterised as individualistic and not social (Pratt 1996). 
The response, grounded in a range of work about learning 
economies,   has   been   that   these   activities   are   all   socially 
embedded (Lundvall  1992;  Grabher  1993;  Pinch,  Henry  et  al. 
2003). To put it simply, being creative in a vacuum is not 
productive. An idea is nothing without production, and goods need 
distribution and consumption. Placed in a context of artists, critics 
and galleries the art takes on social meaning and value, and 
becomes embedded. Again, the  common phrase about genius 
being 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration rings true in the sense 
that ideas have no value until they are applied and operationalised. 
Moreover, researchers point to the processes of making, applying 
and operationalising that require iterative and heuristic, feedback 
and interaction (learning). In short they are collective enterprises. 
This acts as a caution on running away with idealised and a-social 
notion of ‘creativity’, ‘culture’, ‘innovation’ and ‘enterprise’. It is 
noteworthy that the research on the economic clustering of cultural 
activities stresses the socio-economics of location; this work itself 
draws upon a longer tradition of the social production of cultural 
goods (see (Peterson 1976; Becker 1984; Pratt 2004b). 
 
 
Creative occupations 
 
 
It is within the narrow context of enterprise and competition that 
the analysis of creative industries and creative occupations makes 
sense. In fact in this case Florida’s notion of the creative class is a 
better fit than the creative industries. If one were to try to orientate 
Florida’s narrow vision to production one might seek out the key 
creative occupations (a narrower list than Florida’s for sure). This 
is precisely what the arts sector in the UK did in the early 1990s 
(O'brien and Feist 1995; Casey, Dunlop et al. 1996). However, the 
problem with the notion of creative occupations is that – in some 
more neo-classical interpretations - it may place undue stress an 
individual or decontexualised notion of production; one that is 
isolated  from  other  business,  institutions  and   society  more 
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generally. It can also reinforce the common sense notion of 
assuming that ‘front line’ artists or cultural workers are the only 
ones who create value. As noted above one needs to appreciate 
the inter-relationships of the whole production chain, and its ways 
that it is variously embedded in space. A body of recent work by 
Markusen (2006; 2006) avoids these pitfalls and shows how an 
analysis of occupation can provide insight into training and career 
development of artists.   From a different perspective recent 
analyses of the cultural industries have sought to demonstarte how 
important close relationships between parts of the production chain 
are in different industries (Pratt 2006). Without doubt, both 
approaches have analytical value but are differentiated by the 
particular set of policy objectives that they interrogate. 
 
 
The notion of the creative industries is compromised; in this paper 
in an effort to stress the contrast the term ‘cultural industries’ has 
been reserved for approaches that use a production chain 
approach. An alternative is thus to seek an understanding of how 
industry, and not simply occupation, can open up the idea of 
situated cultural production (that includes artists and non-artists: 
but  rely  upon  one  another).  As  noted  above  until  recently 
definitions of artists and the creative industries have been based 
upon occupation, then on industries tied to occupational practice 
(Dcms 1998;2001); it is only with the last revision of methodology 
that a production chain approach has been adopted by policy 
agencies the to understand the cultural industries (Dcms 2003; 
Burns Owens Partnership, Pratt et al. 2006). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this paper has been to  critically evaluate Florida’s 
notion of the creative class and the associated mechanisms that 
he posits for urban regeneration and growth. Florida’s argument 
owes much to place marketing strategies; the key difference is that 
instead of simply attracting tourists, or chief executive officers to 
invest in a location, the creative class are used as a magnet that it 
is hoped will draw in hi-tech industries keen to find the right labour. 
The implication is that cities must adapt themsleves to the values 
and mores of the ‘creative class’. 
 
 
This paper has pointed out several problems with this argument. 
First, the fact that place-based competition for mobile investment is 
a  zero-sum  game.  Second,  the  reification  of  the  relationship 
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between, and separateness of, production and consumption Third, 
the concept of the creative class, and their values, was shown to 
be reductive to occupation. Fourth, Florida’s re-use of Glasser’s 
ideas where a particular skill replaces educational attainment is not 
tested:  the  levels  of  skills  are  reduced  to  a  taxonomy  of 
occupation. Fifth, the conceptual basis of focusing on occupations 
strips out the necessarily embedded relationships with industries 
and with production and consumption; essentially it individualises 
what is a complex and hybrid phenomena: a key point that has 
emerged from work on the cultural industries in recent years 
(Grabher  2001).  On  this  basis,  the  relationship  between  the 
cultural economy and the city, and growth, is misplaced and thus 
needs to be re-cast. In particular, the recent evidence of the huge 
growth in the cultural production sector needs to be addressed and 
explained rather than being swept under the carpet or dismissed 
as ‘consumption’. A recent report for the London Development 
Agency noted that the cultural sector was the third largest sector of 
the London economy(Gla_Economics 2004). 
 
Re-discovering the cultural industries: production 
 
 
This  final  section  offers  some  pointers  toward  a 
reconceptualisation of the role of culture in urban growth and 
change. First, we need to examine, rather than idealise, cultural 
production   in   full,   and   to   conceptualise  its   relationship   to 
production and consumption (Pratt 2004a). Second, we must also 
be open to the flows across the public and private sectors, and 
between social, economic and cultural domains. In this sense the 
cultural industries are a ‘field’ of policy. There seem to be three 
challenges here: to understand the operation of the cultural 
industries, and then to identify local strengths and weaknesses, 
then to consider how, if at all, it is sensible to intervene to change 
matters. Implicit in this consideration is the relationship of profit 
and not-for-profit activities and their inter-dependence9. 
 
 
Without  doubt,  as  numerous  cultural  industries  mapping 
documents have shown, the cultural industries are an economic as 
well  as  cultural presence in  the  world {KEA_European_Affairs, 
2006 #810}; what is more they are growing and they employ 
significant numbers of people in developed countries. Within the 
context of declining economies this is enough to attract policy 
makers to the table. The issue is how to engage with the cultural 
industries. Are they, for example, just the same as any industry 
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and thus susceptible to generic industrial policies? To what extent 
should issues of cultural exceptionalism and national identity be 
taken to justify support these activities? Furthermore, as many 
studies have shown, the cultural industries and the arts can play a 
significant role in addressing issues of social exclusion and 
community support – however, this does not produce great art or 
lots of money. A common confusion exists between policy affecting 
the cultural sector and their various discrete and, often conflicting, 
objectives. Moreover, is any of the above a substitute for ‘old’ arts 
and cultural policies? 
 
 
The great strength of the concept of the cultural industries is that it 
has had a firm basis in production, and that it is a socialised 
concept. This does not mean that the consumption dimensions can 
be ignored; in fact they need to be integrated. It is only at this point 
in the argument that it is safe to bring back the city as context for 
such socialised production. In such an argument the city is a ‘high- 
touch’ environment whereby ill-defined and fuzzy knowledges are 
exchanged – it is a varied informational field within which actors 
negotiate and filter, and produce, knowledge in a very uncertain 
wider environment. Unlike other areas of the economy, some 
aspects of cultural production (and consumption) can be codified 
and normalised, but many cannot; arguably, these are the most 
valuable ideas to this industry. Thus, key high value added 
interactions will continue to embed cultural production in a small 
number of unique parts of cities. Ironically, as cultural production is 
based upon a fashion model – a rapid turnover of product and a 
winner takes all market place - only some places will benefit from 
the  economic  activity  and  the  social  and  cultural  benefits. 
However, the elaboration of such a concept of the cultural 
industries and associated policies are beyond this paper 
(Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005; Pratt 2005). What is clear is that 
the notion of creative class contributes little to such an 
understanding, nor does it form a sound basis for policy making. 
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1 
See for example the Liveability Rankings produced by Mercer Consulting. See 
http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.jhtml?idContent=1128060 (accessed 
June 5, 2007) 
2 
Crucially, not all. 
3 
See also Reich’s (Reich 2000) development of the same theme in the new economy: 
the symbolic analysts. 
4 
Of course, it is unacknowledged that the focus here is the rich developed world. As 
noted above manufacture happens elsewhere. Bell’s point is that manufacture will 
take up less of our productive time, leaving time and resources for design and 
research. The point that I referred to above, and the point that scholars of the service 
industries make is that the manufacturing-service divide is a false one. Services are 
manufacture (Gershuny and Miles 1983; Walker 1985) 
5 
We might recall Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 1979)work again, in particular the linkage 
between education and taste. 
6 
Bell has some rather withering criticisms of the development/destruction of culture 
alongside this highly rationalised regime of leisure and education. See (Bell 1978) 
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7 
In parallel Weberians such as Ritzer (Ritzer 1993) have pointed to the nature of the 
organisation of work and the subtle shifts of control from simple top-down hierarchies 
to ‘self-management’. Somewhere in between is the re-designation of almost every 
employee occupation as a ‘manager’ of some sort. 
8 
Of course this is a hugely problematic notion. The reports authors, in part, sought to 
use the report to argue for more legitimacy for cultural activities in the curricular (as 
opposed to a narrow 3 r’s). 
9 
This is particularly tricky as policy normally is the responsibility of government 
departments: activities that stray across boundaries are not well served. Culture is a 
prime example spanning the Departments of Culture, Industry, and Regeneration. 
